What is the meaning of language expressions and how to compute or calculate it? In this paper, we give an answer to this question by analysing the meanings of aspects and tenses in natural languages inside the formal model of an grammar of applicative, cognitive and enunciative operations , using the applicative formalism, functional types of categorial grammars and combinatory logic . In the enunciative theory and following , an utterance can be decomposed into two components: a modus and (...) a dictum . In GRACE, the modus is a complex operator applied to a proposition and is generated from more elementary operators of the categories of tense, aspect, and modality. The dictum is a proposition generated by a predicative relation. In this way, we can attribute a semantic meaning to different grammatical aspecto-temporal operators. The applicative expressions of CL can be easily translated into a functional programming language such as HASKELL or CAML. (shrink)

This paper defends 'plural reference', the view that definite plurals refer to several individuals at once, and it explores how the view can account for a range of phenomena that have been discussed in the linguistic literature.

The rosy dawn of my title refers to that optimistic time when the logical concept of a natural kind originated in Victorian England. The scholastic twilight refers to the present state of affairs. I devote more space to dawn than twilight, because one basic problem was there from the start, and by now those origins have been forgotten. Philosophers have learned many things about classification from the tradition of natural kinds. But now it is in disarray and is unlikely (...) to be put back together again. My argument is less founded on objections to the numerous theories now in circulation, than on the sheer proliferation of incompatible views. There no longer exists what Bertrand Russell called ‘the doctrine of natural kinds’—one doctrine. Instead we have a slew of distinct analyses directed at unrelated projects. (shrink)

There is a well-documented paradigm-shift in eighteenth century Jesuit philosophy and science, at the very least in Central Europe: traditional scholastic version(s) of Aristotelianism were replaced by early modern rationalism (Wolff's systematisation of Leibnizian philosophy) and early modern science and mathematics. In the field of probability, this meant that the traditional Jesuit engagement with probability, uncertainty, and truthlikeness (in particular, as applied to moral theology) could translate into mathematical language, and can be analysed against the background of the accounts (...) of probability, pre-mathematical Jesuit logic, Wolff's conceptual analysis, and Bernoullian mathematisation. The works of two Jesuit philosophers, Berthold Hauser and Sigismund Storchenau, can be related to this context. The core of their logic of (epistemic) probability is the account of negation (or ‘contradiction’) and implication (or ‘argument’), in particular, the algorithms for computing the reliability of one piece of evidence when compared to the respective counter-evidence and for computing the probability of a conclusion given the probability of its premises. (shrink)

This paper intends to contribute to the evaluation of the project of analyzing speech act concepts in terms of mental state concepts, by examining Searle's and Vanderveken's proposed analyses of certain types of illocutionary acts as expressions of corresponding types of emotional states. It is argued that the proposed analyses are all defective, that the assumptions about underlying speech act/mental state parallelisms from which their initial plausibility might be taken to derive are themselves mistaken, and that the fact (...) that they have been proposed at all betrays insufficient attention to the distinction between semanti-cally and pragmatically determined aspects of utterance interpretation. It is concluded that these results disturb both the overall structure of Searle's and Vanderveken's theory of speech acts, and the logic of several other similarly reductionist claims in the philosophy of language. (shrink)

The main goal of the paper is to present a putative role of consciousness in language capacity. The paper contrasts the two approaches characteristic for cognitive semiotics and cognitive science. Language is treated as a mental phenomenon and a cognitive faculty. The analysis of language activity is based on the Chalmers’ distinction between the two forms of consciousness: phenomenal and psychological. The approach is seen as an alternative to phenomenological analyses typical for cognitive semiotics. Further, a cognitive model of (...) the language faculty is described. The model is implemented in SNePS/GLAIR architecture and based on GATN grammar and semantic networks as a representation formalism. The model - reflecting traditionally distinguished linguistic structures - consists of phonological, syntactic, and semantic modules. I claim that the most important role in the phenomenon of language is played by psychological consciousness. Phenomenal consciousness accompanies various stages of language functioning, but is not indispensable in explanations of the language faculty. (shrink)

A logical theory of oppositions deals with the relation between propositions and their truth values. On the basis of a formal semantics that proceeds by means of questions-answers, three theses are claimed in the following: (1) the concept of opposition usually refers to incompatibility, but our logical analysis focusses upon a broader relation of difference; (2) more generally, opposition has to do with negativity; our semantics accounts for it through opposite-forming operators; (3) subalternation is a particular case of non-contradiction expressing (...) an “opposition of an opposition”; it is not a proper opposition, accordingly, but its very meaning depends upon the latter. There is not only one but rather a number of expressions for negativity and the paper presents a detailed analysis of these "floating" expressions in a twofold sense of the word: floating quantification is closely related to the logical operations of sentential negation and denial; to what extent natural languages do not clearly express the meaning of a negative thought will be exemplified. L'objectif du texte qui suit est double : non seulement proposer une analyse logique du concept d'opposition, susceptible d'apporter de la précision à cette notion tout aussi vague que courante ; mais aussi, proposer une explication des différentes façons dont la négation se manifeste dans les langues naturelles, en particulier dans notre modèle local de la langue française. Tandis que la communauté des linguistes propose couramment une distinction entre une négation logique et une négation linguistique, l'article qui suit a la prétention d'une explication unifiée de la négation, c'est-à-dire un cadre théorique commun dans lequel ces deux aspects de l'opérateur de négation apparaissent comme des cas particuliers aux significations distinctes. Il n'y aurait donc pas une négation logique, d'un côté, et une négation linguistique ou "métalinguistique", de l'autre. Une approche structurelle des expressions négatives devrait apporter un éclairage sur ce point, par le biais d'une analyse algébrique de la signification en termes de questions-réponses. Mais revenons pour commencer sur l'origine philosophique du concept d'opposition, avant d'en exposer les propriétés logiques par la suite et les expressions linguistiques pour conclure. (shrink)

Among the important conceptual innovations introduced in the second scholasticism era and motivated by theological debates following the Council of Trent were the theories of moral necessity and moral implication. As they were centred upon a view of moral necessity as a form of necessity weaker than physical necessity, and moral implication as weaker than physical implication, some interpretations of moral necessity encouraged the logic of statistical hypotheses and probability. Three branches of this debate are studied in this paper: (...) the explanation of moral necessity in terms of suppositio, the confrontation over the interpretation of moral necessity, and the theory of statistical quantification. (shrink)

If a conclusion was reached that creatures without a language capability exhibit some form of a capability for logic, this would shed a new light on the relationship between logic, language, and thought. Recent experimental attempts to test whether some animals, as well as pre-linguistic human infants, are capable of exclusionary reasoning are taken to support exactly that conclusion. The paper discusses the analyses and conclusions of two such studies: Call’s (2004) two cups task, and Mody (...) and Carey’s (2016) four cups task. My paper exposes hidden assumptions within these analyses, which enable the authors to settle on the explanation which assigns logical capabilities to the participants of the studies, as opposed to the explanations which do not. The paper then demonstrates that the competing explanations of the experimental results are theoretically underdeveloped, rendering them unclear in their predictions concerning the behavior of cognitive subjects, and thus difficult to distinguish by use of experiments. Additionally, it is questioned whether the explanations are rivals at all, i.e. whether they compete to explain the cognitive processes of the same level. The contribution of the paper is conceptual. Its aim is to clear up the concepts involved in these analyses, in order to avoid oversimplified or premature conclusions about the cognitive abilities of pre- and non-linguistic creatures. It is also meant to show that the theoretical space surrounding the issues involved might be much more diverse and unknown than many of these studies imply. (shrink)

The late scholastic era was, among others, contemporary to the “emergence of probability”, the German academic philosophy from Leibniz to Kant, and the introduction of Newtonian physics. Within this era, two branches of the late-scholastic analysis of induction can be identified, one which can be thought of as a continual development of earlier scholastic approaches, while the other one absorbed influences of early modern philosophy, mathematics, and physics. Both branches of scholastic philosophy share the terminology of (...) modalities, probability, and forms of arguments. Furthermore, induction was commonly considered valid as a result of being a covert syllogism. Last but not least, there appears to be a difference in emphasis between the two traditions’ analyses of induction: while Tolomei discussed the theological presuppositions of induction, Amort’s “leges contingentium” exemplify the principles of induction by aleatory phenomena and Boscovich’s rules for inductive arguments are predominately concerned with the generalisation of macro-level observations to the micro-level. (shrink)

This dissertation is concerned with normativity both as an explanatory device in the philosophy of language, logic and epistemology and as a philosophical issue in its own right. Following later Wittgenstein and Sellars, it is argued that language is normative, in the first instance because of the fact that speech acts take place within a structure of social norms and institutions. This fact is then utilized to show that important features of semantic content can be explained in terms of (...) such norms. ;This Sellarsian conception of linguistic usage as the performance of acts within a linguistic game of giving and asking for reasons, leads us to focus on inferential proprieties as central to semantic content. It is, then, natural to look at logical vocabulary, paradigmatically 'entails', as expressing the very normative relations definitive of this content. An idea of Brandom's is developed in providing a formal theory of the inferential content of logical vocabulary. Such normative-inferentialist semantic analyses are developed for a wide range of logical systems. ;A certain conception of justification also falls naturally out of this general theory of language. If asserting is an act performed within a linguistic game, then justification can be thought of as a matter of winning such a game, a successfully defending one's assertion in the face of licensed challenges to it. This account is developed, drawing consequences for the theory of rationality and knowledge. ;The second major issue of the dissertation is the theory of the normative itself and much of the constructive work in the philosophy of language, philosophy of logic and epistemology forms a case study for a particular theory of the normative. On the basis of Wittgensteinian considerations, it is argued that normativity must be understood as resting ultimately on social practice. ;We solve problems of earlier accounts of norms by introducing a novel normative relation between assertions of normative propriety and social practices. Normative assertions do not describe existing social standards, but do nonetheless derive their semantic content from those standards. This argument carried through in detail for cases of logical and epistemic vocabulary in the dissertation. (shrink)

For C.S. Peirce, who had a well‐known influence on many aspects of Ramsey's thought, pragmatism was viewed as inseparable from realism. The aim of this paper is to challenge the view according to which Ramsey's reflexions on universals are of a mere linguistic and logical nature. Not only is this view controversial, but it may be argued that some elements in Ramsey's analyses suggest a possibly realist answer to the problem of universals. By drawing comparisons with Peirce's own (...) position, it is suggested that Ramsey's views might not be inconsistent with many aspects of Peirce's scholastic and even Scotistic version of realism. (shrink)

Qiyās, or “correlational inference” (often glossed as “analogy”), comprises a primary set of methodological tools recognized by a majority of premodern Sunnī jurists. Its elements, valid modes, and proper applications were the focus of continual argument and refinement. A particular area of debate was the methodology of determining or justifying the ʿilla: the legal cause (or occasioning factor, or ratio legis) giving rise to a ruling in God’s Law. This was most often discussed (and disputed) under the rubric of “the (...) modes of causal justification” (masālik al-taʿlīl). Among these modes was the much debated test of dawarān (concomitance of presumed cause and effect). In brief, proponents of dawarān employed it to justify claims that a property (waṣf) occasioned the ruling (ḥukm) in an authoritative source-case (aṣl). In concert with other considerations, the demonstrated co-presence (ṭard) and co-absence (ʿaks) of property and ruling—that is, their concomitance “in existence” (wujūdan) and “in nonexistence” (ʿadaman)— was taken as an indication that the property was the ruling’s ʿilla. Delving further into dawarān and causation (ʿilliyya), the current study interprets “in existence” and “in nonexistence” not as a kind of metaphor for true and false (within the framework of a classical truth-functional formal semantics), but as an accurate terminology vis-à-vis the meaning of causality statements, fully compatible with dominant Islamicate views on causal agency. In brief, a deeper logical and linguistic analysis of the different existential modes of dawarān strongly suggests that we should distinguish property (or phenomenon) and ruling (or effect) as types (concepts or propositions linguistically expressed by a sentence) as opposed to tokens (instantiations of the type; the real, ontological events that verify the proposition). Our reading of dawarān as shaped by a finer-grained structure not only allows us to identify the efficient occasioning process as a function which takes some particular token of the ʿilla (arguably, the property or properties which provide the ruling’s material cause) and renders a token of the general ruling type, but it allows us to elucidate the role of taʿlīl (causal justification) in shaping an epistemological theory of argument to the best explanation: a sophisticated, premodern manifestation of abductive reasoning. (shrink)

The seventeenth century can be viewed as an era of (closely related) innovation in the formal and natural sciences and of paradigmatic diversity in philosophy (due to the coexistence of at least the humanist, the late scholastic, and the early modern tradition). Within this environment, the present study focuses on scholastic logic and, in particular, syllogistic. In seventeenth-century scholastic logic two different approaches to logic can be identified, one represented by the Dominicans Báñez, Poinsot, (...) and Comas del Brugar, the other represented by the Jesuits Hurtado, Arriaga, Oviedo, and Compton. These two groups of authors can be contrasted in three prominent features. First, in the role of the theory of validity, which is either a common basis for all particular theories (in this case, sentential logic and syllogistic), or a set of observations regarding a particular theory (in this case, syllogistic). Second, in the view of syllogistic, which is either an implication of a general theory of validity and a semantics of terms, or an algebra of structured objects. Third, in the role of the scholastic analysis of language in terms ofsuppositio, which either is a semantic underpinning of syllogistic, or it is replaced by a semantics of propositions. (shrink)

This Handbook documents the main trends in current research between logic and language, including its broader influence in computer science, linguistic theory and cognitive science. The history of the combined study of Logic and Linguistics goes back a long way, at least to the work of the scholastic philosophers in the Middle Ages. At the beginning of this century, the subject was revitalized through the pioneering efforts of Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, and Polish philosophical logicians such (...) as Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz. Around 1970, the landmark achievements of Richard Montague established a junction between state-of-the-art mathematical logic and generative linguistic theory. Over the subsequent decades, this enterprise of Montague Grammar has flourished and diversified into a number of research programs with empirical and theoretical substance. This appears to be the first Handbook to bring logic-language interface to the fore. Both aspects of the interaction between logic and language are demonstrated in the book i.e. firstly, how logical systems are designed and modified in response to linguistic needs and secondly, how mathematical theory arises in this process and how it affects subsequent linguistic theory. The Handbook presents concise, impartial accounts of the topics covered. Where possible, an author and a commentator have cooperated to ensure the proper breadth and technical content of the papers. The Handbook is self-contained, and individual articles are of the highest quality. (shrink)

This volume provides analyses of the logic-reality relationship from different approaches and perspectives. The point of convergence lies in the exploration of the connections between reality – social, natural or ideal – and logical structures employed in describing or discovering it. Moreover, the book connects logical theory with more concrete issues of rationality, normativity and understanding, thus pointing to a wide range of potential applications. -/- -/- The papers collected in this volume address cutting-edge topics in contemporary discussions (...) amongst specialists. Some essays focus on the role of indispensability considerations in the justification of logical competence, and the wide range of challenges within the philosophy of mathematics. Others present advances in dynamic logical analysis such as extension of game semantics to non-logical part of vocabulary and development of models of contractive speech act. -/- Table of Contents: Introduction: Majda Trobok, Nenad Miščević and Berislav Žarnić.- I. Logical and Mathematical Structures.- Life on the Ship of Neurath: Mathematics in the Philosophy of Mathematics: Stewart Shapiro.- Applied Mathemathics in the Sciences: Dale Jacquette.- The Philosophical Impact of the Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem: Miloš Arsenijević.- Debating (Neo)logicism: Frege and the neo-Fregeans: Majda Trobok.- II. Epistemology and Logic.- Informal Logic and Informal Consequence: Danilo Šuster.- Logical Consequence and Rationality: Nenad Smokrović.- Logic, Indispensability and Aposteriority: Nenad Miščević.- III . Dynamic Logical Models of Meaning.- Extended Game-Theoretical Semantics: Manuel Rebuschi.- Dynamic Logic of Propositional Commitments: Tomoyuki Yamada.- Is Unsaying Polite?: Berislav Žarnić.- IV Logical Methods in Ontological and Linguistic Analyses.- Towards a Formal Account of Identity Criteria: Massimiliano Carrara and Silvia Gaio.- A Mereology for the Change of Parts: Pierdaniele Giaretta and Giuseppe Spolaore.- Russell versus Frege: Imre Rusza.- Goodman’s OnlyWorld: Vladan Djordjević.-. (shrink)

RESUMEN Este trabajo pretende relacionar dos debates emparentados sobre cómo la lógica y el lenguaje influyen sobre el pensamiento. Existe un eje de discusión en relación a si hay una pluralidad de lógicas o un único sistema lógico como criterio de evaluación para cualquier contexto de razonamiento. En lingüística, el debate surgido a partir de las interpretaciones fuertes y débiles de la hipótesis Sapir-Whorf ha centralizado la discusión en torno al grado de influencia o determinación del lenguaje sobre el pensamiento. (...) Desde perspectivas y marcos teórico-conceptuales diferentes, lógica y lingüística delimitan y problematizan un campo de indagación y reflexión. El artículo, desde una mirada transdisciplinar, pretende dar cuenta y postular vasos comunicantes entre estos debates atendiendo a los matices de cada enfoque, así como proponer una hipótesis propia sobre la problemática planteada. ABSTRACT This paper aims to relate two debates about how logic and language influence thought. There is an axis of discussion about whether there exists a plurality of logic or a single logical system as an evaluation criterion for any reasoning context. In linguistics, the debate arising from the strong and weak interpretations of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis has centralized the discussion around the degree of influence or determination of language on thought. From different perspectives and theoretical-conceptual frameworks, logic, and linguistics delimit and problematize a field of inquiry and reflection. The article, from a transdisciplinary perspective, intends to account for and postulate communicating vessels between these debates, considering the nuances of each approach. It also seeks to propose its own hypothesis on the problem raised. (shrink)

Scholastic hylomorphism conceives prime matter and substantial form as metaphysical parts of every physical substance. During the early modern period, both hylomorphic constituents faced significant criticism as scientists and philosophers sought to replace Aristotelianism with physical explanations for the workings of the universe. This paper focuses specifically on prime matter and delves into the arguments put forth by four 16th-century scholastic philosophers – Toledo, Fonseca, Góis, and Suárez – in their attempts to establish the existence of prime matter. (...) Firstly, I analyse a set of arguments rooted in substantial change, which emphasize the crucial role of a persistent, common substrate in the processes of generation and corruption. Secondly, I explore a set of ex-nihilo arguments and, thirdly, I examine a series of demonstrations based on the interplay between accidental and substantial change. Although these three sets of arguments converge on the necessity of a common substrate for substantial change to occur, they fall short of demonstrating that this substrate is both prime and shared by all natural entities. Fourthly, I turn to a set of arguments centred on the impossibility of infinite regress, designed to complement those related to natural change, and I assess additional arguments that do not primarily focus on substantial change. Lastly, I draw my conclusions on these argumentative strategies to demonstrate the existence of prime matter. (shrink)

This book constitutes the thoroughly refereed post-proceedings of the Third International Conference on Logical Aspects of Computational Linguistics, LACL'98, held in Grenoble, France, in December 1998. The 15 revised full papers presented together with one invited paper were carefully reviewed and selected during two rounds of refereeing from 33 submissions and 19 conference presentations. Among the topics covered are various types of grammars, categorical inference, automated reasoning, constraint handling, logical forms, dialogue semantics, unification, and proofs.

This book constitutes the thoroughly refereed post-proceedings of the Second International Conference on Logical Aspects of Computational Linguistics, LACL '97, held in Nancy, France in September 1997. The 10 revised full papers presented were carefully selected during two rounds of reviewing. Also included are two comprehensive invited papers. Among the topics covered are type theory, various types of grammars, linear logic, parsing, type-directed natural language processing, proof-theoretic aspects, concatenation logics, and mathematical languages.

Theories of adverbial modification can be roughly distinguished into two sorts. One kind of theory takes logical form to follow surface grammatical form. Adverbs are treated as unanalyzable logical operators that turn a predicate or sentence into a different predicate or sentence respectively. And new rules of logic are stated for these operators. -/- A different kind of theory does not suppose that logical form must parallel surface grammatical form. It allows that logical form may have more to do (...) with deeper structures that might be studied in transformational grammar. Adverbs are treated as surface forms of the underlying predicates represented by corresponding adjectives and verbs. 'Slowly' is derived from 'slow'; 'intentionally' from 'intentional' or 'intend'; etc. And new rules of logic are avoided where they can be. -/- In this paper I attempt to state some of the advantages of the second sort of theory. My procedure will be this. First, I will try to say in outline what theories of logical form are. Then I will state five principles for evaluating such theories. Next, I will sketch the sorts of analyses acceptance of principles (1)-(5) leads to. In particular I will talk about adverbial phrases (e.g. locatives) that are best analyzed in terms of implicit references to events, relative modifiers (like 'large') which relate something to a comparison class, and 'that' clauses taken as names of propositions. By appealing to principles (1)-(5) I will defend these analyses against certain others, one that appeals to many logical operators, a second that treats all sentences as names of propositions, and a third that sees implicit reference to possible worlds in the language being analyzed. Finally, I will offer a pragmatic defense of my approach in terms of principles (1)-(5) as against a different approach that appeals to possible world semantics. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 127 from Adam, and inheriting "real sins" with real "guilt." From his De libero arbitrio onward, Augustine sees that if Adam's is the sin of someone "other" than ourselves, then it is alienum to us, is simply not "our" sin, and we cannot be held "guilty" of it. On the other hand, he is willing to accept that God might fittingly decree that Adam's descendants "inherit" the (...) debt, obligation, weakness, sickness, or mortality (choose the Augustinian metaphor you prefer) that is appropriate punishment for the sin which Adam (personally) committed. But, at bottom, Rigby and Sage have the same difficulty: both assume that Augustine was a "creationist," when he was not. For he saw that creationism must necessarily view our individual souls as metaphysically "other" than Adam's, so that God could never judge us guilty of that "other's" sin. Rigby would have been wiser to combine and extend the insights he himself quotes from Huftier (59 n. 14), Bonner (78-79: omnes fuimus ille unus), TeSelle (86), Confessions 4.31 ("by our own act": nos inde ruimus), and Rondet (121 n. 6). Augustine thought that we sinned the original sin (nos inde ruimus) precisely because we were metaphysically identical with our father Adam: fuimus iUe unus. I submit that the very same theory, making our souls identical with Adam's, subtends both the Confessions and Augustine's anti-Pelagian writings. ROBERT J. O'CONNELL Fordham University Mark D. Johnston. The Spiritual Logic of Ramon LluU. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987. Pp. x + 336. $65.oo. In the last twenty-five years a considerable number of scholars have turned their attention to the sort of formal logic found in the writings of the Catalan polymath, Ramon Lull (d. x316). This attention has run parallel to the current interest in medieval logic and linguistic theory, although Lull was less concerned with the theory of the properties of terms than with formulating a realistic theory of the predicables and categories and a new theory of demonstration. In the work under review Mark Johnston provides us with a study of Lulrs logic which is systematic in character. His work represents a first attempt to go beyond the studies of individual points of doctrine and to situate the development of Lulrs logic within the context of the evolution of the Ars lulliana. The work is divided into two parts. The first part analyzes the early writings to the year 13o3, the second the later ones composed between 13o3 and 1316. Johnston takes the very early Compendium logicae Algazelis as his point of departure for the first part and the Logica nova of 13o3 as that for the second part. He describes Lull's thought following the sequence of the different tracts of the Aristotelian logic and relates its development to the biography of the Majorcan philosopher. Throughout his study Johnston emphasizes three special characteristics in Lull's approach: its popular nature, its extreme realism, and its moralizing intention. Lull's works were composed both in Latin and in Catalan and aimed at an audience quite different than that of the clerical universities of the Middle Ages. His approach as- 128 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 28"1 JANUARY 199o sumed a natural ontology, realist and "essentialist," which was of Avicennian derivation. His argumentation presupposed the idea that individual beings are concrete realizations of abstract essences situated in a scala creaturarum which leads in degrees to the divinity. The idea of basing philosophical discourse on the hierarchical structure of creation appealed to Lull because in it he found something common to the Christian, Jewish, and Islamic traditions. This fact made his logic necessarily an extremely realist one, consciously opposed to the logic of the Scholastics. From the extreme realism of Lulrs logic to his moralizing intent, it is but a step. To explain the status of things as real, Lull formulated a tropological exegesis of creation by way of the scala creaturamtm. Johnston accordingly directs our attention to the importance of analogy in Lull's logic. The analogical character of Lulrs logic had indeed been emphasized by the brothers Carreras y Artau in their history of Spanish philosophy... (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to explore some of the possibilities, advantages and difficulties of corpus-based analyses of semantic and pragmatic aspects of language in one particular field, namely the linguistic expression of emotion concepts. For this purpose, a methodological procedure is proposed and an exemplary analysis of the emotion concept “fear” in English is performed. The procedure combines Kövecses' lexical approach and Stefanowitsch's metaphorical pattern analysis with additional concepts from corpus linguistics such as semantic preference and (...) semantic prosody. The results of the study show that such a corpus-based analysis of emotion words offers several advantages. Firstly, by exploring the surroundings of the search word in a vast amount of text, we are not only able to find evidence of conceptual metaphor and metonymy that structure the emotion concept and of related emotion concepts, but also we can enrich the description of the emotion concept with information from a series of dimensions and add a pragmatic viewpoint by revealing an explicit or implicit evaluation of the emotion. The second advantage offered by a corpus-based approach lies in the possibility of quantifying results, i.e., comparing the frequency, productivity and creative use of individual metaphors and metonymies, which is especially interesting in view of contrastive studies. (shrink)

Aristotle divided arguments that persuade into the rhetorical (which happen to persuade), the dialectical (which are strong so ought to persuade to some degree) and the demonstrative (which must persuade if rightly understood). Dialectical arguments were long neglected, partly because Aristotle did not write a book about them. But in the sixteenth and seventeenth century late scholastic authors such as Medina, Cano and Soto developed a sound theory of probable arguments, those that have logical and not merely psychological force (...) but fall short of demonstration. Informed by late medieval treatments of the law of evidence and problems in moral theology and aleatory contracts, they considered the reasons that could render legal, moral, theological, commercial and historical arguments strong though not demonstrative. At the same time, demonstrative arguments became better understood as Galileo and other figures of the Scientific Revolution used mathematical proof in arguments in physics. Galileo moved both dialectical and demonstrative arguments into mathematical territory. (shrink)

This book examines the evidential status and use of linguistic intuitions, a topic that has seen increased interest in recent years. Linguists use native speakers' intuitions - such as whether or not an utterance sounds acceptable - as evidence for theories about language, but this approach is not uncontroversial. The two parts of this volume draw on the most recent work in both philosophy and linguistics to explore the two major issues at the heart of the debate. Chapters in (...) the first part address the 'justification question', critically analysing and evaluating the theoretical rationale for the evidential use of linguistic intuitions. The second part discusses recent developments in the domain of experimental syntax, focusing on the question of whether formal and systematic models of gathering intuitions are epistemically and methodologically superior to the informal methods that have traditionally been used. -/- The volume provides valuable insights into whether and how linguistic intuitions can be used in theorizing about language, and will be of interest to graduate students and researchers in linguistics, philosophy, and cognitive science. (shrink)

The scholastic philosopher is interested in definition for a different reason than the lexicographer and linguist. The philosopher is trying to learn things. Fe defines, after investigating reality, in an attempt to describe reality clearly and to sum up some aspect of his understanding of reality. Hence, we find our scholastic philosophers adopting as a main feature of their method this insistence on defining, on precise and detailed explanation of their definitions, and on proving that their definitions da (...) correctly express what a nature or activity is. A dictionary of the language of scholastic philosophy fitted to the needs of beginners and of undergraduate students of the subject is not available in English. (shrink)

The third chapter gives an account of the debates over Cartesianism outlined below, which shifted from the University of Utrecht to Leiden, where the new philosophy was introduced by Adriaan Heereboord in the early 1640s, and was carried on by Johannes de Raey at the end of the decade. In Leiden, the quarrels over Cartesianism were prompted by the intervention of the theologian Jacob Revius, criticising Descartes’s philosophy as a source of Pelagianism in 1647. This gave rise to a series (...) of attacks, replies, and counter-replies which would dominate Dutch Cartesianism well into the 1650s: Revius’s Methodi cartesianae consideratio theologica (1648), Statera philosophiae cartesianae (1650), and Cyriacus Lentulus’s Nova Renati Descartes sapientia (1651) offered a full-blown critique of Descartes’s philosophy, focusing on his metaphysics, method and on their uses in academia. Such critiques are analysed in this chapter as they brought about the first foundation of Cartesian philosophy after Descartes himself, namely, the development of a ‘Cartesian Scholastic’ by Johannes Clauberg, professor at Herborn and Duisburg. In fact, Clauberg’s defence and foundation of a Cartesian academic philosophy was not the effort of one philosopher, but was coordinated with De Raey and with other members of the Cartesian network in the Netherlands and in Germany (including Abraham Heidanus, Tobias Andreae and Christopher Wittich), as a means to avoid the bans on Cartesianism and to provide a decisive answer to the theologians. This coordinated strategy of defence is revealed by two letters of De Raey to Clauberg: their contents shed light on the background of Clauberg’s foundation, which constitutes the first, Cartesian reworking of the academic curriculum. In his works, indeed, Clauberg maintained a metaphysical foundation embodying rational-theological arguments, while providing at the same time a logical theory of the method for natural philosophy, as well as for law, theology and medicine. Yet, his concerns with the traditional structure of the curriculum led him to develop, besides a Cartesian first philosophy, also an ontosophia, whose object is being as such. This is considered by Clauberg not only in the light of the ‘first notions’ of mind and body, but also of those abstracted from concrete realities, as ‘unity’, ‘goodness’, ‘truth’, and so on. This ultimately results in the reduplication of metaphysics, which will be reduced by Clauberg’s followers – dealt with in the next chapters. (shrink)

The idea that the Leviathan frontispiece offers a visual summary of the contents of the work is widespread. However, the analysis of the frontispiece often under-explores Leviathan's text or leaves certain iconographic elements aside. In discussions of the Scholastics ‘Dilemma’ emblem, for instance, the image is commonly reduced to a representation of ‘logic’ or ‘scholasticism’, leaving aside the intricate interrelationship between the objects present in the image and their connection with the content of the book. This paper argues that (...) this image helps understanding Hobbes’ critique of Scholastic doctrines and their political effects in Leviathan. For Hobbes, these supposedly pure philosophical concepts either in logic (trident of the ‘Syllogism’) or metaphysics (‘Real/Intentional’ bident) hide a central part of Scholastic thought: a ‘seditious’ political conception claiming that the Pope has an indirect right to temporal power in affairs concerning spiritual matters theory (‘Spiritual/Temporal’ and ‘Direct/Indirect’ bidents). The Scholastic model made the common people believe that the Pope would have at least as much authority as the Sovereign. When faced with the choice between obeying either the Pope or their Civil Sovereign the subjects would find themselves in a dangerous ‘Dilemma’. (shrink)

This is the first book-length study of Descartes's metaphysics to place it in its immediate historical context, the Late Scholastic philosophy of thinkers such as Suárez against which Descartes reacted. Jorge Secada views Cartesian philosophy as an 'essentialist' reply to the 'existentialism' of the School, and his discussion includes careful analyses and original interpretations of such central Cartesian themes as the role of scepticism, intentionality and the doctrine of the material falsity of ideas, universals and the relation between (...) sense and understanding, causation and the proofs of the existence of God, the theory of substance, and the dualism of mind and matter. His study offers a picture of Descartes's metaphysics that is both novel and philosophically illuminating. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to discuss theories that attempt to single out the class of intentional states by appealing to factors that are supposedly criterial for intentional sentences. The papers starts with distinguishing two issues that arise when one thinks about intentional expressions: the Taxonomy Problem and the Fundamental Demarcation Problem. The former concerns the relation between the classes of distinct intentional verbs and distinct intentional states. The latter concerns the question about how to distinguish intentional states and (...) acts from the non-intentional ones. Next, the general desiderata for theories providing criteria for singling out the class of intentional sentences are introduced. Finally, distinct proposals for providing such criteria are analyzed. Author argues that neither is satisfactory. (shrink)

A modal logic is developed to deal with finite ordered binary trees a they are used in linguistics. A modal language is introduced with operators for the ‘mother of’, ‘first daughter of’ and ‘second daughter of’ relations together with their transitive reflexive closures. The relevant class of tree models is defined and three linguistic applications of this language are discussed: context free grammars, command relations, and trees decorated with feature structures. An axiomatic proof system is given for which (...) completeness is shown with respect to the class of finite ordered binary trees. A number of decidability results follow. (shrink)

This paper investigates the reason why, in the tradition of Western philosophy, a logic of relations was developed only in the second half of the nineteenth century. To this end, it moves along two different but interconnected paths: on the one hand, it attempts to reconstruct the main views concerning the ontology of relations during the middle ages; on the other, it focuses on the treatment of so-called oblique terms in the logical works of some preeminent authors belonging to (...) the scholastic and late-scholastic tradition. From the ontological point of view, realists and nominalist both denied that polyadic expressions of the language signify polyadic properties in the world extra. Some authors, such as Peter Auriol, claimed that polyadic expressions signify something merely mental, thus recognizing, even though in a limited ontological domain, the existence of full-fledged relations, that is, of ‘things’ simultaneousl... (shrink)

This book presents a collection of chapters on the nature, flexibility and acquisition of lexical categories. These long-debated issues are looked at anew by exploring the hypothesis of lexical polycategoriality –according to which lexical forms are not fully, or univocally, specified for lexical category– in a wide number of unrelated languages, and within different theoretical and methodological perspectives. Twenty languages are thoroughly analyzed. Apart from French, Arabic and Hebrew, the volume includes mostly understudied languages, spoken in New Guinea, Australia, New (...) Caledonia, Amazonia, Meso- and North America. Resulting from a long-standing collaboration between leading international experts, this book brings under one cover new data analyses and results on word categories from the linguistic and acquisitional point of view. It will be of the utmost interest to researchers, teachers and graduate students in different fields of linguistics (morpho-syntax, semantics, typology), language acquisition, as well as psycholinguistics, cognition and anthropology. (shrink)

This paper introduces a comprehensive logical framework to reason about threshold-driven diffusion and threshold-driven link change in social networks. It considers both monotonic dynamics, where agents can only adopt new features and create new connections, and non-monotonic dynamics, where agents may also abandon features or cut ties. Three types of operators are combined: one capturing diffusion only, one capturing link change only, and one capturing both at the same time. We first characterise the models on which diffusion of a unique (...) feature and link change stabilise, whilst discussing salient properties of stable models with multiple spreading features. Second, we show that our operators (and any combination of them) are irreplaceable, in the sense that the sequences of model updates expressed by a combination of operators cannot always be expressed using any other operators. Finally, we analyse classes of models on which some operators can be replaced. (shrink)

Description Logics (DLs) are a family of well-known terminological knowledge representation formalisms in modern semantics-based systems. This research focuses on analysing how our developed Occurrence Logic (OccL) can conceptually and logically support the development of a description logic. OccL is integrated into the alternative theory of natural language syntax in `Deviational Syntactic Structures' under the label `EFA(X)3' (or the third version of Epi-Formal Analysis in Syntax, EFA(X), which is a radical linguistic theory). From the logical point of (...) view, OccL is a formal logic that mainly deals with the occurrences of symbols as well as with their priorities within linguistic descriptions, i.e. natural language syntax, semantics and phonology. In this article---based on our OccL-based definitions of the concepts of `strong implication' and `occurrence value' as well as of the logical concept `identical occurrence constructor (IDOC)' that is the most fundamental logical concept in our formalism---we will model Occurrence Description Logic ($\mathcal{ODL}$). Accordingly, we will formally-logically analyse `occurrence(s) of symbol(s)' within descriptions of the world in $\mathcal{ODL}$. In addition, we will analyse and assess the logical concepts of `occurrence' and `occurrence priority' in $\mathcal{ODL}$. This research can make a strong logical background for our future research in the development of a Modal Occurrence Description Logic. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to reformulate the Linguistic Underdeterminacy Thesis by making use of Austin’s theory of speech acts. Viewed from the post-Gricean perspective, linguistic underdeterminacy consists in there being a gap between the encoded meaning of a sentence uttered by a speaker and the proposition that she communicates. According to the Austinian model offered in this paper, linguistic underdeterminacy should be analysed in terms of semantic and force potentials conventionally associated with the lexical and (...) syntactic properties of the pheme uttered by the speaker; in short, it is claimed that the conventionally specified phatic meaning of an utterance underdetermines its content and force. This Austinian version of the Linguistic Underdeterminacy Thesis plays a central role in a contextualist model of verbal communication. The model is eliminativist with respect to rhetic content and illocutionary force: it takes contents and forces to be one-off constructions whose function is to classify individual utterances in terms of their representational and institutional effects, respectively. (shrink)

The author contends that analyses of ambiguities such as 'a', 'the', 'is', Are not on "the same level as the investigation of principles of logic." (staff).

Two parallelism hypotheses have been adopted and the third one on their relationship has been put forward. The illocutionary logic hypothesis states that the logic of linguistic commitments runs parallel to the logic of intentionality. The normative pragmatics hypothesis states that the logic of utterances runs parallel to the logic of linguistic commitments. According to the third stance or the logic projection hypothesis, the logic of utterances is the origin of all (...) other logics used in describing psychological and social realities. Consequently, the imperative logic or logic of utterances constitutes an independent but not self-sufficient research topic. The logic of utterances manifests itself in its meaning effects such as deontic and bouletic ones. It can be studied only in relation to deontic logics of the hearer’s obligation and the speaker’s linguistic commitments and in relation to logics of intentionality of the speaker’s expression and the hearer’s impression. Therefore, research in logic of imperative and other utterances must include investigation of relations between logics. (shrink)

These lectures are the first extensive application of Husserl's newly developed genetic phenomenology to perceptual experience & to the way in which it is connected to judgments & cognition. Students of phenomenology will find this work indispensable.

This article is the result of research on the occurrences of the terms suppositio, supponere and their linguistic derivations in the literature on fallacies of the second half of the thirteenth century. The authors analysed are Albert the Great, Giles of Rome, Simon of Faversham, the so-called Incerti Auctores, the Anonymous of Prague and John Duns Scotus. The central elements that emerge are the role played by the notion of suppositum and by the linguistic context to determine the (...) denotation of an expression, and the importance of the metaphysical problem of the unity and identity of suppositum in both the theory of predication and the theory of inference. Both subjects, obviously, are closely connected. (shrink)

Evidence is presented to show that the role of a generative grammar of a natural language is not merely to generate the grammatical sentences of that language, but also to relate them to their logical forms. The notion of logical form is to be made sense of in terms a natural logic, a logical for natural language, whose goals are to express all concepts capable of being expressed in natural language, to characterize all the valid inferences that can be (...) made in natural language, and to mesh with adequate linguistic descriptions of all natural languages. The latter requirement imposes empirical linguistic constraints on natural logic. A number of examples are discussed. (shrink)

The relation between linguistics and logic has been discussed in a, recent paper by Bar-Hillel} where it is argued that a disregard for workin logical syntax and semantics has caused linguists to limit themselves too narrowly in their inquiries, and to fall into several errors. In particular, Bar-Hillel asserts, they have attempted to derive relations of synonymy and so-called ‘rules of transfOI`1'Il8.tiOH,, such as the active—pussive relation, from distributional studies alone, and they have hesitated to rely on considerations of (...) meaning in linguistic analysis. No one can quarrel with the suggestion that linguists interest themselves in meaning or transformation rules, but the relevance of logical syntax and semsmticsz (at least as we now know them) to this study is very dubious. I think that a closer investigation of the assumptions and concems of logical syntax and semantics will show that the hope of applying the results which have been achieved in these fields to the solution of linguistic problems is illusory. (shrink)